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A rapid expansion of trade liberalization in Thailand during the 1990s raised a critical
question for policy transparency from various stakeholders. Particular attention was
paid to a bilateral trade negotiation between Thailand and USA concerned with the
impact of the ‘Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Rights (TRIPS) plus’ provisions
on access to medicines. Other trade liberalization effects on health were also
concerning health actors. In response, a number of interagency committees were
established to engage with trade negotiations. In this respect, Thailand is often cited
as a positive example of a country that has proactively sought, and achieved, trade
and health policy coherence. This article investigates this relationship in more depth
and suggests lessons for wider study and application of global health diplomacy
(GHD). This study involved semi-structured interviews with 20 people involved in
trade-related health negotiations, together with observation of 9 meetings concerning
trade-related health issues. Capacity to engage with trade negotiations appears to
have been developed by health actors through several stages; starting from the
Individual (I) understanding of trade effects on health, through Nodes (N) that
establish the mechanisms to enhance health interests, Networks (N) to advocate for
health within these negotiations, and an Enabling environment (E) to retain health
officials and further strengthen their capacities to deal with trade-related health
issues. This INNE model seems to have worked well in Thailand. However, other
contextual factors are also significant. This article suggests that, in building capacity
in GHD, it is essential to educate both health and non-health actors on global health
issues and to use a combination of formal and informal mechanisms to participate in
GHD. And in developing sustainable capacity in GHD, it requires long term
commitment and strong leadership from both health and non-health sectors.
Keywords Capacity, diplomacy, Thailand, trade
KEY MESSAGES
 Trade liberalization, especially its effects on price and access to medicines, has been at the core of GHD.
 Thailand is often cited as a positive example of a country that has achieved considerable trade and health policy
coherence through, and as part of, GHD.
 Core lessons are for health actors to build their capacity over time, starting from the individual (I) to understand trade
effects on health, the node (N) to establish the mechanisms to enhance health interests, the network (N) to advocate for
health, and the enabling environment (E) to retain health officials and strengthen their capacities.
 This INNE model seems to have worked well in Thailand.
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Introduction
‘Global health diplomacy’ (GHD) has been increasingly dis-
cussed in the global health literature by scholars in recent years
(Kickbusch et al. 2007; Fidler 2009; Lee and Smith 2011).
Although the definition of GHD is contested, there appears to
be some consensus that GHD involves negotiation processes by
which state and non-state actors interact concerning issues at the
nexus of health and foreign policy; these may be in the use of
health to serve foreign policy goals or foreign policy to serve
health goals (Drager and Fidler 2007; Fidler 2009; Kickbusch
2011; Lee and Smith 2011; Kevany 2014). Within this broad
definition, this article is primarily concerned with GHD as it
applies to trade issues, although it is recognized that there are
wider aspects of GHD such as those concerning security,
international relations and donor prestige of global health
programmes. It is also primarily concerned with how trade
affects health, and less concerned with how health issues and
diplomacy may impact on these other areas, such as security or
investment. There is a work emerging linking foreign policy and
GHD (Kevany 2014) more generally. The interesting develop-
ment in this work is making explicit the diplomatic and foreign
policy criteria (e.g. neutrality, visibility, sustainability, geostra-
tegic considerations, accountability, effectiveness) for global
health programmes to achieve GHD.
For a country to engage successfully in GHD, capacity is
required in two areas: (1) health agencies require the
resources and ability to interact with the wider diplomatic
system and (2) the diplomatic organization within a country
requires an understanding and willingness to reflect health
concerns within their wider diplomatic remit that is often
focused on trade and security. To some extent these two areas
of capacity can be developed simultaneously and in a
complementary manner if systems are in place to encourage
dialogue between health and other agencies. Although there
has been discussion of how such capacity may be developed at
the supra-national level (Chan et al. 2008; Smith et al. 2009),
the core of diplomatic activity remains at the national level,
and thus such capacity within the nation state remains critical
to GHD.
In this respect, Thailand provides an interesting case study.
Literature on trade and health often cites Thailand as a leader
in policy coherence between trade and health (World Health
Organization and World Trade Organization 2002; Blouin 2007;
Helble et al. 2008; Smith et al. 2009). This is because people
tend to see the superficial, but the full picture is more rounded,
nuanced and informative to developments in GHD. This study
explores the relationship between trade and health spheres in
more depth.
Conflicting interests between trade and health sectors first
became evident here some 30 years ago, when Thailand pro-
hibited cigarettes imported from the USA on the grounds that
they contained hazardous substances that were more harmful
than those substances found in Thai cigarettes. The World Trade
Organization ruled in 1989 that Thailand’s action in prohibiting
US cigarettes on this basis was not scientifically justified, as
Thailand had failed to provide convincing scientific evidence to
validate its claim (Crettol and Gavin 1990; World Health
Organization and World Trade Organization 2002). This case
stimulated interest in the impact that international trade nego-
tiation, and attendant agreements, could have on health out-
comes. In the 1990s, Thailand experienced an expansion of trade
liberalization (e.g. Thailand–Australia Free Trade Agreement,
Japan–Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement, and
Thailand–United States Free Trade Agreement) which created
tensions between government departments, and between gov-
ernment and civil society organizations (CSOs), suggesting that
policy was driven by ‘vague foreign policy goals’, and was not
transparent (Sally 2005). As part of this expansion, the negoti-
ation of a bilateral trade agreement between Thailand and the
USA was a major wake-up call for the health community, as the
USA demanded that Thailand commits to strong intellectual-
property protection (‘TRIPS-plus’) (Hunton and Williams 2003).
This commitment sought to limit the government’s ability to issue
compulsory licenses, one of the primary exemptions in the TRIPS
agreement to improve access to medicines (IHPP and WHO 2007;
Kessomboon et al. 2010). In response, the Ministry of Public
Health (MOPH) established a number of inter-agency commit-
tees (with representatives from government and non-
governmental agencies) in 1998 to develop an understanding of
health-related trade issues and engage with the trade negotiation
processes to address health concerns (Pachanee and
Wibulpolprasert 2004; Ministry of Public Health 2008a).
There have been several further related activities. The MOPH
built a network, together with universities, the Ministry of
Commerce and funding bodies, to develop ‘a research frame-
work on trade in health services’ in 2003 (Pachanee and
Wibulpolprasert 2004). By 2007, the new national constitution
for Thailand stipulated that the government was to provide
trade information to the public, have public consultations and
parliamentary approval before engaging in trade negotiations
with other countries (Royal Thai Government 2007). The
Ministry of Commerce was made responsible for national
trade policy development and mandated to have stakeholder
consultations before participating in trade negotiation pro-
cesses. As a consequence of these developments, the prepar-
ation processes for trade negotiations involved a wider degree
of concerned agencies, including those representing health
interests. The prior movements by the MOPH had allowed the
development of significant capacity in the health sector and
among CSOs to be able to participate actively in consultations
from a health perspective (Pachanee and Wibulpolprasert
2004). The National Health Assembly (NHA), established in
2008, for example, has become a specific forum to bring actors
together to discuss health issues arising from wider policies,
including those related to trade, and at the global level, Thai
representatives have been successful in tabling a resolution on
‘International trade and health’ at the World Health Assembly
in 2006 (Tangcharoensathien 2010).
With the increased emphasis on trade negotiations by those
within the broader health field, the experience of health
engagement by Thailand with other interested parties before,
during and after specific diplomatic activities related to trade
negotiations, holds potential lessons for wider engagement at
the national level, and in developing capacity more broadly in
GHD.
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Methodology
This article utilizes three information sources: a review of key
literature, interviews with key stakeholders and non-participant
observation during related international meetings on trade-
related health negotiations.
With respect to interviews with key stakeholders, 20 inter-
views with those who engaged in the process of trade-related
health negotiations were conducted in Thailand during
November 2010–February 2011. Due to the sensitive nature of
the issue, many respondents asked not to be identified in this
article. Respondents were from state, non-state and intergov-
ernmental organizations; seven from MOPH, one from Health
Systems Research Institute (HSRI), three from Ministry of
Commerce, two from Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), one
from Office of the National Economic and Social Development
Board, one from a private hospital, one from business, one from
an academic institution, one from a non-governmental orga-
nization (NGO) and two from international governmental
organizations. This sample was determined by their roles
within the process of trade-related health negotiations. Once
interviews were underway, respondents were asked for sugges-
tions of further people to interview. Towards the end of the
interview process, it was felt that new issues were not being
raised, leading the authors to some confidence that key issues
have been uncovered.
The interviews were semi-structured, with questions follow-
ing organically according to responses being made and infor-
mation being shared, but were set to cover several broad topic
areas: actors in trade negotiations, health actors engagement
trade negotiations, networking among the actors and evaluation
of health engagement in trade negotiations. Most interviews
were conducted in the Thai language and were recorded with
respondents’ permission. All recordings were transcribed and
translated by the first author.
The final source of information was from the observed
discussions of health-related trade issues at the meetings held
during November 2010–February 2011. The first author observed
nine meetings as an observer without engaging with the meeting;
the 63rd meeting of the Committee on Coordinating Services
(CCS), 25th Meeting of the Healthcare Services Sectoral Working
Group (HSSWG), Public Consultation on 8th Package of
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) ASEAN Framework
Agreement on Services (AFAS), 3rd National Health Assembly,
Stakeholder consultation on 8th Package of AFAS, 3rd Meeting of
National Commission on International Trade and Health Study,
Meeting of the Committee on Global Health and International
Trade, 64th Meeting of the CCS and 26th Meeting of the HSSWG.
Information from above sources was analysed using the
‘Framework Approach’ developed by Ritchie and Spencer
(1994), through five steps: familiarization of data, identifying
a thematic framework based on study objectives, indexing the
data, charting the data and mapping and interpretation of the
findings (Ritchie and Spencer 1994). The analysis from each
source was then triangulated to generate a holistic picture
concerning the development of capacity for GHD within
Thailand, and in particular: (1) the key actors involved in
capacity building; (2) the model used by Thailand for capacity
development and (3) key aspects related to the process of
capacity development.
Thailand’s key actors in health and
trade
There are a number of institutional actors in Thailand that have
a potential stake in issues relating to health and trade. These
actors can be divided into two groups: health actors and trade
actors, both align with two subgroups: state and non-state
(Box 1).
State health actors
The MOPH is the core national health agency responsible for
disease prevention, health promotion and health protection.
Other key health-related players include: the HSRI, an autono-
mous state agency, which aims to achieve ‘better knowledge
management for better health systems’1; and the National
Health Commission Office (NHCO), an autonomous health
agency mandated to support public participation in building
healthy public policies and to organize the NHA; the health
professional councils (e.g. Thai Medical Council, Dental
Practitioner Council and Nursing Council) who work under
MOPH supervision and have a role in regulating and controlling
health practitioners and their practices; the Thai Health
Promotion Foundation (ThaiHealth), an autonomous organiza-
tion responsible for promoting public health with focusing on a
reduction of health risk factors2; the National Health Security
Office (NHSO), a semi-autonomous body established in 2002 to
manage a national health insurance scheme.
Non-state health actors
The CSOs, particularly the National Health Foundation (NHF),
Health Promotion Institute, the Human Right Commission, FTA
watch, Drug Study Group, HIV/AID Patients’ Network, AIDS
Access and Foundation for Consumers (FFC), are the key
players in trade policymaking process. The Private Hospital
Association (PHA), established to protect and enhance the
mutual benefits of private hospitals, is also actively involved in
such process.
State trade actors
Of the state trade actors, the most critical are: the Committee
on International Economic Relations Policy (CIERP), composed
of policy elites3 from economic ministries who play a crucial
role in directing trade liberalization policy, and appoint nego-
tiator teams for all trade negotiations; the National Economic
and Social Advisory Council (NESAC), a public agency that
plays an advisory role to the cabinet regarding social and
economic issues; the Department of Trade Negotiations (DTN)
under the Ministry of Commerce (MOC), who have a role in
drafting the frameworks for all trade negotiations and, since
2007, mandated to hold consultations with all concerned
stakeholders to develop the framework for negotiations and
propose it to the Parliament for approval (Talerngsri and
Vonkhorporn 2005); the MFA, which was tasked with leading
bilateral trade negotiations with the United States4 and Japan5,
and plays a facilitating role to oversee whether agreements
require parliamentary approval6; the parliament, which plays a
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role in reviewing the framework of trade negotiations and
approves it before and after negotiations with trading partners.
Non-state trade actors
The Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, Industry, and
Banking (JSCCIB), composed of the Thai Chamber of
Commerce (TCC), Federation of Thai Industries (FTI) and
Thai Banker’s Association (TBA), has been frequently consulted
by the government during the process of trade liberalization
policy formulation and trade negotiations (Pibulsonggram 2004;
Peamsilpakulchorn 2006).
The dominant actors are the CIERP and DTN from the trade
side, and MOPH from the health side (Pachanee and
Wibulpolprasert 2004; Talerngsri and Vonkhorporn 2005). The
ultimate responsibility lies with the MOC who will sign trade
agreements, but other agencies have considerable influence in
determining the outcome of negotiations. For example, if the
USA wanted Thailand to agree with ‘data exclusivity’ and
‘patent checking’ before drug registration, these are within the
‘state power’ remit of the MOPH. In this respect, one may
broadly categorize trade organizations as concerned with
advancing the trade liberalization policies of Thailand, and
the MOPH representing the major concerns of the health
community of the potential negative impact of trade liberal-
ization. A senior advisor to the MOPH stated that ‘MOPH was
interested in trade liberalization policy since the Uruguay round
as they were convinced that TRIPS would affect access to
affordable medicines. We acted seriously against the amend-
ment of the patent act from the late 1980s to early 1990s. We
(MOPH) sent our staff to join the Doha negotiation on TRIPS.
We did not want to open our health market through any trade
agreements . . .’7 An anonymous MFA official stated that: ‘the
MOPH may be concerned with the brain drain from trade
liberalization . . .’8 ‘the ministry was concerned with the nega-
tive impact of trade liberalization on the health system, thus
engaging in the process of trade negotiations to minimize that
impact . . .’9 The ministry thus works with other actors like
academia, CSOs and NHCO to advance health interests, and is
generally perceived to be an active actor, having a good
understanding of the health impact of trade. 10
The NHCO has become involved in the process of trade
negotiations since the NHA resolution on ‘Public participation
in free trade negotiation processes’ came into existence in 2008.
It also takes a secretarial role for the new interagency
committee established by the National Health Commission
(NHC), chaired by the Prime Minister; ‘the National
Commission on International Trade and Health Study’
(NCITHS). This commission is a ‘strong commission’, in the
sense that it is appointed by the Prime Minister. Nevertheless,
consensus building by the commission on trade in alcohol and
tobacco products for instance remains to be achieved (National
Commission on International Trade and Health Study 2010a,b;
2011): ‘the commission members (especially representatives
from private sector and civil society) have different perspectives
on trade in harmful products. . . it is very challenging for the
commission to achieve consensus on these issues’.11 Other
health actors, such as HSRI and ThaiHealth, have neither power
nor legitimacy to take part in the process of trade negotiations,
but create a coalition of interested parties and work closely with
MOPH and NHCO.
Box 1 Actor in trade-related health negotiations
Actors Agencies Responsibilities Concerns about
Health
State
MOPH Health promotion, disease control and preven-
tion, treatment, and health rehabilitation
Access to medicines, brain drain of medical
doctors
HSRI Health systems research management Brain drain of medical doctors
NHCO Healthy public policy development Population’s wellbeing
ThaiHealth Health promotion with focusing on a reduction
of health risk factors
Prevalence of tobacco and alcohol
consumption
NHSO Manage a national health insurance scheme Access to quality health services
Health professional
councils
Regulate and control the practice of health
practitioners
Migration of health professionals
Non-state
PHA Protect and enhance mutual benefits of private
hospitals
Market access/business opportunity
CSOs Advocate for vulnerable groups Access to medicines and brain drain of
medical doctors
Trade
State
CIERP International economic relations policy Trade competition and economic growth
DTN Formulate trade policy and establish the
framework for trade negotiations
Trade competition and economic growth
MFA Promote interaction with the global
community
Strengthen trade diplomacy
NESAC Advise the Prime Minister and cabinet on
social and economic issues
Impact on social and economic problems
Non-state
JSCCIB Advocate for business opportunity Business opportunity
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Actors engaged with the process of trade negotiations clearly
do not do so on an equal basis. The level of their engagement
and influence in such a process depends especially on three
factors: (1) power to influence decision making; (2) legitimacy
to be involved and (3) urgency in resolving the issue. These
factors are often used to differentiate actors and to assess the
level of their influence in the decision-making processes
(Mitchell et al. 1997). The MOC, possessing all of these factors,
would be considered to be the most powerful actor in any
trade-related health policy development process.
The INNE model for capacity building
Trade issues initiated action by the MOPH to develop capacity
for engaging with trade negotiations where there were felt to be
significant health issues. This development of capacity was
based on the United Nations Development Programme INNE
Model (UNDP 1997). This model covers four aspects of
capacity building: Individual, Node, Network and Enabling
environment.
Individual capacity (I)
The MOPH initially established the ‘International Health (IH)
Scholar Program’ in 1998 to build up individual capacity on
global health issues. Scholars were recruited from ministries,
universities and NGOs. They undertake on-the-job training,
under close mentorship and work on global and regional
health issues. They prepare a national position on their assigned
agendas in consultation with concerned domestic stakeholders
and senior mentors, and participate in meetings concerning these
issues in a variety of fora, such as the World Health Organization
(WHO) and Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. In
the last five World Health Assemblies, the Thai delegation (more
than 50 each year) out numbered far bigger countries such as the
USA and Japan, and Thailand used the forum of the WHO
Executive Board and the WHA especially for ‘real-world’ capacity
development in GHD. Scholars are encouraged to build coalitions
with ‘like-minded’ countries who have similar interests on
particular global health agendas and pursue similar goals.
Debriefings after the meetings include discussion of the down-
stream process and steps in implementing the decision or
resolutions. These activities provide the scholars opportunity to
enhance their technical, negotiation and communication skills
and, critically, ‘allows scholars to build up their courage to speak
up and negotiate at the international meetings’.12
Node (N) or organization
The MOPH then established the semi-autonomous
International Health Policy Program (IHPP) in 2000 to be a
hub for capacity building on global health issues and GHD,
with a mission to ‘conduct policy relevant research and get
research into policy and practice’.13 IHPP fellows are trained
through apprenticeships with senior researchers prior to formal
academic (Masters/PhD) training. A number of nodes or key
organizations were also established to accommodate the trained
researchers. A recent node is the International Trade and
Health Programme established in mid-2010 as a collaborative
programme between MOPH, WHO, HSRI, NHSO, NHCO and
ThaiHealth, whose goal is to ‘build up and strengthen individ-
uals and institutional capacities in order to generate evidence-
based policy decisions and coherence policies between interna-
tional trade and health for the positive health outcomes of the
population’ (IHPP 2010). This programme has become the
technical secretariat of the NCITHS (National Commission on
International Trade and Health Study 2010b). ‘The Programme
generates evidence (of trade effects on health) to support
NCITHS’s making decisions and also for health negotiators to
use in trade negotiations’.14
Network (N)
The IHPP and MOPH have collaborations with both domestic
and external institutions to exchange and share knowledge. The
‘research framework on trade in health services’ introduced in
2003 was a collaboration of MOPH, academics, research
funding bodies and the private sector (Pachanee and
Wibulpolprasert 2004). The Thailand Research Fund (TRF)
also granted financial support to the ‘WTO Watch’ project15 to
develop knowledge on WTO and its rules in order to provide
concrete information for establishing the national position at
the Doha Development Round of negotiations. The FTA Digest
website16 was further supported by the TRF to educate the
public on the implication of WTO agreements and report the
progress of international trade negotiations. More broadly,
Thailand was instrumental in the establishment of ‘GHD.Net’,
an international network concerned with the application of
GHD (GHD-NET 2009).
There is also an informal network of collaborations among
health policy makers, health researchers, trade officers, trade
negotiators, foreign policy officers, academic institutions, trade
policy funding agencies, private sector and CSOs. The import-
ance of the informal network is discussed in more detail later.
Enabling environment (E)
The enabling environment covers institutional, sociopolitical,
economic, and environmental contexts; many of which are
beyond the MOPH’s official remit. However, the Ministry has
an official mandate to provide financial and non-financial
incentives, establish organizations to accommodate health
experts, and establish the Prince Mahidol Award Conference
(Ministry of Public Health 2010) as a venue for domestic
scholars to engage in a global health policy and build a network
with international health experts.17 ‘This forum allows us
(MOPH) to bring our scholars and partners to link more with
the world.’18 It is also the case that often issues generate public
support (e.g. access to medicines) and public media attention,
which may be useful in domestic support for the approach
taken to an issue in broader GHD.
Establishing the process of health
engagement in wider diplomacy
To complement capacity building of individual health officials
and organizations, a variety of other mechanisms are used by
MOPH to get health concerns on the trade negotiation agenda:
institutional mechanisms, interagency committees and working
groups, the NHC and NHA and informal processes.
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Institutional mechanisms
The administrative structure of ministries in Thailand is
founded on hierarchy and authority, with co-ordination
among ministries undertaken through institutional arrange-
ments. This leads to the common problem of co-ordination and
engagement.
For instance, the Food and Drug Administration is concerned
with trade-related food or drug issues, the Department of
Health Service Support (DHSS) trade in health-related services,
Department of Medical Sciences (DMSc) Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT)/Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS),
Department of Disease Control (DDC) and Bureau of Policy
and Strategy (BPS) for trade-related health services under the
AFAS (Figure 1). As the health inspector general of the MOPH
states, ‘In my perspective, the bureaucratic system has long,
cumbersome procedures which are not suitable for the present
working environment’.19
The structure of the MOPH agencies, outlined in Figure 1,
contributes to a lack of oversight and coherence between those
concerned with trade issues affecting health. The MOPH does
not have a single office to cover all health related trade issues,
but tasks a particular health-related issue office to a respective
office (Figure 1) that shares a rather defensive view of trade.
This prevents the ministry to get the ‘best deal’ from trade in
both a defensive and offensive manner as required. For
example, there is a limited potential to join up and/or trade-
off policies between areas, such as may be required in the case
of medical tourism and health worker migration, where there
are debates about the extent to which increased foreign
patients stimulates the rural-to-urban health worker migration,
or conversely could be a strategy to reduce international
migration of Thai health workers.
In this respect, an important feature of the Thai system for
GHD is Article 190 of the 2007 Constitution, which mandates
the DTN to make the process of trade negotiations transparent
to the public (Royal Thai Government 2007). Prior to trade
negotiations with other countries, DTN is required to consult
concerned stakeholders, organize public hearings and submit
the framework for negotiations to parliament for approval.
After negotiations conclude, the signed agreements are open for
public access before being submitted to parliament for approval
(Figure 2) (Vonkhorporn 2010). Concerned stakeholders are
thus able to voice their concerns through both public consult-
ations and public hearings. This unusually open process for
policymaking has enabled the MOPH, and others, to engage
with MOC through these consultations.
Interagency co-operation
Partly in response to the ‘bureaucratic system’, in 1998 the
MOPH established a number of inter-agency committees,
especially the ‘Ministerial Committee on Health Impact from
International Trade’, with their subcommittees for TRIPS, SPS,
TBT and General Agreement on Trade in Services, to discuss
and manage health issues arising from trade negotiations and
to co-ordinate with the Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of
Industry.
For example, during 2004–2006, the MOPH engaged in the
negotiation processes under the Thai–US FTA. A working group
to study the impact of the TRIPS-Plus provision found that it
would have a significant impact on the cost of medicines and
delay generic drug accessibility. Their findings were presented
to MOC senior officials for inclusion in the framework for
negotiations (IHPP 2007). This strong evidence-based move-
ment delayed the conclusion of the negotiation (which was
eventually suspended in 2006 due to the coup de´tat) (Ahearn
and Morrison 2006).
As another example, in 2009 the NHC, chaired by the Prime
Minister, appointed the National Commission on International
Trade and Health Study, composed of key stakeholders
(Figure 3). Its main responsibility is to offer policy recommen-
dations on health-related trade issues to the Prime Minister
(National Health Commission 2009). It is noteworthy that this
committee is chaired by a senior member of the Thai Chamber
of Commerce, who is also the Vice President of the NHA.
Of course, the development of these interagency committees
and working groups is ad hoc, and it is not clear how
productive (or generalizable) it was (Pachanee and
Wibulpolprasert 2004). Although stakeholders are represented,
often appointed members send junior staff, and one senior
advisor to MOPH felt that ‘The committees could not be
regarded as productive’.20 An academic also felt that the
interagency committees did not offer a strong health position
for negotiators.21 These committees also face challenges in how
to ensure their recommendations reach policy makers.22
Nonetheless, this approach can be valuable in increasing
understanding and awareness of trade and health among
agencies, and create friendships among officers (see section
later on Informal mechanisms).
NHC and NHA
The annual NHA convened by the NHC under the 2007
National Health Act allows stakeholders to participate in
discussions on the development of national health policy.
Topics are proposed by stakeholders, based on its urgency and
health impact (National Health Commission Office 2008). Trade
and health issues have received high attention since the first
NHA in 2008. The resolution resulting from this meeting—
‘Public participation in free trade negotiation processes’—was
endorsed and came into force in 2009. At the third NHA in
2010, the agenda included ‘Prevention of the negative impact of
trade liberalization on health and society’ (National Health
Commission Office 2010).
The NHA is a promising forum for stakeholders, particularly
civil society, to discuss issues and find resolutions (National
Health Commission Office 2008). A senior MOPH official stated
that ‘the NHA is one of the mechanisms that can solve the
complex (health) issues that require multi-sectoral collabor-
ation’.23 However, NHAs have become dominated by representa-
tives from CSOs, with most public agencies not vocal.24 ‘The
assembly should take a soft approach, different viewpoints should
also be acknowledged; otherwise, those whose voices are not
heard would hesitate to join the next NHA.’25 A similar concern
was also expressed by the Director of Bureau of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, who urged health actors to approach DTN softly
with strong evidence and a clear health policy.26
Nevertheless, NHA resolutions are endorsed by the cabinet
and Prime Minister and have come into force for relevant
authorities. For example, the resolution concerning the ‘Medical
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Hub Policy’, e.g. impacts on investment, as the Board of
Investment is required not to grant tax exemption for those
investing in health services for commercial purpose (Sarnsamak
2011).
Informal mechanisms
A more informal mechanism of health engagement with trade
exists in personal relationships and networks. The former
MOPH Permanent Secretary and Public Health Minister
emphasized that ‘in Thai culture, personal relationships are
very important . . . if we depend only on the formal co-
ordinating mechanism among the ministries we cannot work
fast or that efficiently . . . we need to build the networks with
both international and local partners who have mutual interests
with us . . . we also need to build a coalition with CSOs to help
us move on the complex issues . . .’27
The MOPH started to support CSOs for health development in
1990 (Ministry of Public Health 2008a). ‘We granted financial
support to CSOs as well as educated them so that they can help
us mobilize public movement outside (the ministry) . . . we have a
network with them but not that strong, having some conflict
sometimes, but not much . . . we foster trust with each other. . .’28
For example, the MOPH supported the role of NGOs at the
Conference of the Party (COP) of the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which is the governing
body of the FCTC composed of 177 parties.29 During the second
session of the Conference (COP 2) held in Bangkok in 2007,
MOPH representatives lobbied other parties to vote for a Thai
health NGO (Health Promotion Institute) to chair the Bureau
and to be President of the third session of the Conference
(COP 3) held in South Africa in 2008. At the same meeting,
another tobacco expert from ASH (Action on Tobacco and
Health) was appointed as the chief Thai delegate. It is not
unusual that the government appoints NGOs to represent the
country at a global health negotiating body.30 In the Thai
delegations to the WHA, for example, there are also leaders from
NGOs, private sector and even mass media. Indeed, some senior
MOPH staff are also members or leaders of NGOs themselves.
Such activities are also the case at the international level. The
WHA resolutions31 related to trade issues, for example, were
tabled and chaired by Thailand. A senior advisor to MOPH stated
that ‘we need to move at the global health forum such as the WHA
to have resolutions on pressing issues so that we can use them as
references for health movements at a domestic level’.32 One good
example is to successfully push for an operative paragraph in a
WHA resolution to request the Director General of the World
Health Organization to support member states in implementing
TRIPS flexibilities to achieve better access to essential medicines.
This allowed WHO/Headquarters to form an expert team to assess
the Thai compulsory license system and provide excellent tech-
nical advice as well as social support, and a joint publication by
WHO, UNAIDS and United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) to support developing countries to implement TRIPS
flexibilities (UNAIDS 2011).
These informal mechanisms are also important to bring
health concerns onto the agenda of trade negotiations. The
Director of the Bureau of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
suggested that the ‘MOPH needs to make friends with the
secretariat of the negotiator team’.33 In addition, building
informal relationships at two levels—working and institutional
relationships—is essential,34 as is building capacity for non-
health actors if they are to advocate for better health: ‘there is a
need to build capacity for both health actors and trade actors
on global health’.35 A staff exchange programme between MOC
and MOPH was also suggested to promote mutual understand-
ing among the ministries.36
Department of Health 
Services Support
Food and Drug 
Administraon  
Department of 
Medical Sciences
Standards and quality of 
goods trade  
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Health 
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Figure 1 Structure of MOPH agencies responsible for trade and health issues
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Overall, the processes of health engagement with trade
negotiations have both strengths and weaknesses. The institu-
tional mechanisms are essential, but slow to implement and in
their operation due to hierarchies of governmental administra-
tion with involvement of several decision makers, thus not
sufficient to advocate for health goals alone. The interagency
committees help increase the understanding of trade and health
among health and non-health actors, but most are ad hoc and
lack the constant and consistent participation of their members.
So far, interagency committees, including the NCITHS, have not
had a great impact on the trade policy agenda. The NHA is
successful in terms of enabling the broad array of actors from
health and non-health sectors to participate in discussion
around NHA resolutions. However, not all resolutions concern-
ing trade and health have been accepted by trade actors,37 and
may thus be seen as unsuccessful in terms of policy implemen-
tation, even if they may have been successful in terms of policy
process. It is also the case that informal mechanisms appear to
help foster trust amongst actors, but assessment of their impact
on policy coherence is unclear. This study refutes the literature
citing that Thailand is a country that has achieved trade and
health policy coherence. However, it confirms that the country
has established important co-ordinating mechanisms between
trade and health agencies to communicate a health position for
trade considerations, which has influenced the process to some
degree over recent years. Perhaps the most significant, visible,
improvement coming from the Thai case is the investment in
constant capacity development of health actors in understand-
ing the linkages between trade and health, and the MOPH
improving its own mechanisms to better engage with the trade
negotiation process.
Conclusion
The ability to engage in successful GHD begins at the national
level, with capacity for health agencies to influence the wider
domestic trade agenda, and for other agencies to appreciate the
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Aer the agreement 
came into force   
Prior to trade negoaons 
Figure 2 Preparatory process for trade negotiations in Thailand. Source: Vonkhorporn (2010)
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health implications of wider agreements. Given that power
within diplomacy more generally resides with those beyond the
health community, then it becomes de facto the responsibility
of the health community to initiate this. As this article
illustrates, it is important in this respect for countries to
consider four complementary elements for developing capacity
in GHD: (1) the power and legitimacy of the relevant actors; (2)
the ability of the actors to perform GHD activities; (3) formal
structures for interaction and negotiation and (4) informal
networks and relationships between those involved in different
agencies.
This article has analysed how one country—Thailand—has
sought to develop capacity to engage in GHD. Although this active
development is perhaps an exception, it serves well to provide
lessons, of which there are three most notables. First, it is essential
to develop capacity for both health and non-health actors. These
actors all need to understand the health impact of non-health
policies, and vice versa, and to integrate assessment of these
impacts, if they are going to have informed dialogue and health
issues be better reflected in trade negotiations. Second, mechan-
isms for interaction among relevant agencies may benefit from
combining both the institutionalized and the ad hoc. Third, an
informal network is always essential in building the trust upon
which collaboration—especially cross-sector—is based.
It is worth noting that countries should also seek to share
experience and capacity with likeminded others. Certainly, the
capacity developed in Thailand was also used to assist other
South-East Asia Region (SEAR) Member States in developing
and strengthening capacity of their health and related profes-
sionals. For instance, the Thai MOPH, in collaboration with the
WHO Regional Office for South-East Asia, and the ThaiHealth
Global Link Initiative Program, organized the first regional
training course on global health in May 2010, covering issues
debated at the 63rd World Health Assembly. The course is now
to be conducted in SEAR Member States on a rotation basis
prior to WHA and other global health meetings every year
(SEARO WHO 2010).
In sum, developing sustainable capacity requires long-term
commitment and strong leadership. The activities in Thailand
have been going for more than 20 years. These activities are
based on a comprehensive strategy, which includes consider-
ation of the individual, nodes, networks and enabling environ-
ment (INNE). Attempts at creating policy coherence are done
under several inter-ministerial mechanisms, created by the
trade ministry as well as the health ministry. The promulgation
of the new constitution, in 2007, which requires parliamentary
approval of trade negotiation frameworks, and the promulga-
tion of the National Health Act in 2007, has allowed a national
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Figure 3 Composition of the national commission on trade and health appointed by the Prime Minister. Source: National Health Commission (2009)
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mechanism for multi-stakeholder public policy dialogue and
development. This provides a good sociopolitical foundation,
but requires capacity in GHD to be continually nourished and
further strengthened to ensure that future challenges of
increasing trade liberalization, such as through the establish-
ment of the ASEAN Community, may be adequately addressed.
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